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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ED\XIIN N. H A\"'V'S; :MILDRED HAWS,
ALLIE HA \"'V'S, HERlVIOINE HAWS
ROSE, GARLAND H. HAWS, LUCINDA A. HAWS BALLAM,
Plainti/JJ and ReJ pondentJ,

Case No. 7267

vs.

JOHN P. JENSEN·
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal is taken ·from the Decree of the Honorable
Marriner M. Morrison, former judge of the District Court
of the First Judicial District in and for Cache County, State
of Utah, whereby and wherein on the 17th day of August,
1948, he entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendant thereby imposing a trust on a Warranty
Deed which was absolute and unconditional on its face. (Ex·
hibit "A," TR. 2, 4, 5, 26-30).
This was a suit in equity and the appeal is upon both the

law and facts.
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PLEADINGS
That part of the complaint pertinent to the discussion
herein is. as follows:
That on or about the 18th day of August, 1927, .Maria
Anderson Haws executed a Warranty Deed to one Amber
Haws for and in consideration of $1.00, love and affection,
conveying the property in question. That Maria Anderson
Haws died on the 24th day of March, 1939, leaving as her
heirs at law the plaintiffs and Amber Haws, the grantee. At
her direction the deed was recorded in the office of County
Recorder, Cache County, Utah, on the 2nd day of December,
1933. That prior to and at the time of execution of the deed
and following its execution and at the time of its recording
and delivery the grantor intended that the grantee would take
the s~id property as trustee for the use and benefit of the
grantor and all of her children and the grandchildren of one
of her deceased sons. That the conveyance of the property,
while in the form of a warranty deed, was to create an oral
trust. That the terms of said trust provided that the trustee
should hold and maintain said property as a family home to
be used by the grantor and/or her children or the children of
the said children then living for so long as any of the said
persons should need a home with complete discretion in the
trustee as to which of said persons should use said property.
That the beneficiaries under said trust were the plaintiffs herein.
That the grantee knew of the terms of said trust and the intention of the grantor in executing said deed and that shortly after
is execution and delivery the grantee accepted the trust and
,proceeded to perform and carry out the terms thereof in
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accordance with the spirit, desire and intention of the grantor;
that she carried out the terms of the said trust until her death.
That the grantee during the month of April, 1939,
married the defendant herein and was known thereafter as
Amber Haws Jensen, that on the 16th day of March, 1945
she died; that at the time of the defendant's marriage with
the grante_e and at all times thereafter he knew of the existence
of the trust and that he had recognized the existence of said
trust at diverse times and upon diverse occasions, and that
as a fraud_ upon the plaintiffs and with full knowledge of the
existence of said trust now refuses to permit any of the plaintiffs
to enter upon said property and that he refuses to recognize
the vaJidity .of the trust and claims said property hy right of
succession, free and clear of said trust and all of the equities
of the plaintiffs herein.
That the property in question was distributed to the
defendant as the sole heir at law of Amber Haws Jensen, the
grantee, on the 13th day of February, 1947. (TR. 3-6).
DEMURRER
To the complaint, the defendant filed a general demurrer
on the grounds that the complaint did not state sufficient
facts to constitute a cause of action and that said action was
barred by Chapter 5 of U.A.C. 1943, Section 33-5-1 and ,other
sections_ applicable thereto. , . (TR. 7). The demurrer was
argued and subsequently overruled by the court. (TR. 7, 35).

AMENDED ANSWER
Defendant admitted the execution and delivery of the
deed by its recording, the death of both . the grantor and

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
grantee, admitted the marriage of grantee and defendant
and that the defendant was the surviving heir of the grantee,
and that the plaintiffs were the heirs of the grantor. He
denied each and every other allegation of the complaint. By
way of a further and separate answer, he alleged that the
grantee paid a fair and reasonable consideration for the property and that the deed was delivered to the grantee absolutely
and without condition. By way of a further answer he alleged
that the action was barred by 33-5-1 and 35-5-3, U.C.A. 1943.
By way of further defense he also alleged that the action
was barred by 104-2-24, U.C.A. 1943. (TR. 12, 13).
Upon the issues thus drawn the cause was heard by the
court sitting without a jury.
At the beginning of the trial the defendant objected to
the introduction of any oral testimony for the purpose of
i.mposing the trust on the property for the reason that the
plaintiffs had pleaded an express trust and that such is contrary to the statute of frauds. He made the further objection
that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action. The
objection was overruled: (TR. 49).
FURTHER STATEMENTS OF FACT
On the 18th day of August, 1927, the grantor, a widow,
executed to her daughter Amber Haws as grantee, a warranty
deed conveying the property in question. The deed was
abs9lute and unconditional on its face without any reservations
whatsoever. The grantor retained possession of it until the
2nd day of August, 1933, when she caused it to be recorded
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by Lucinda Haws Ballam, one of the plaintiffs, in the recorder's
office, Cache County, Utah.

(Exhibit "A" TR. 149, 150).

At the date of the commencement of this action, on the
19th day of March, 1947, both the grantor and grantee were
dead, the grantor having died on the 24th of March, 1939,
and the grantee on the 16th of March, 1945. The action was
also started two years after the grantee's death and just .five
days short of nine years of the grantor's death, also nearly
20 years after execution of the deed and 14 years after its
delivery. (TR. 3-6).
In 1919 the grantee left Utah, making her home in
California where she resided until 193 7, all the while being
gainfully employed and making from 63 cents to $1.25 per
hour. She quit her employment and returned to Hyrum, Utah,
to take care of her mother who was sick, which she did until
her mother's death two years later. (TR. 60-62, 167-168,
197-198, Exhibit "5").
The grantee was the oldest in the family and assisted
her mother since she began working in 1917 until the latter's
death in 1939. She remained unmarried until her mother's
death when she married the defendant April 8, 1939 at the
ageof47years. (TR. 114,180, 204).
In fact, she not only helped her mother .financially over
the years but she paid the expenses of her mother's last illness,
including her doctor's bill and funeral expenses except the sum
of $75.00 which was furnished by the State Welfare Department. On April 5, 1939, she paid $100.00 on account to the
Thompson Funeral Home; April 8, 1939, she paid $8.00 for

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

cement work and the digging of the grave; on May 12, she
paid $75.00 furnished by the Welfare Department arid $50.00 ·;;
of her own ·money. (TR. 161, 167, 168, 171, l99, 201 and
Exhibit "6").
That Amber Haws, the grantee, was of financial assistance to her mother and family and had been for over a number
of years is further indicated by the fact that she paid the funeral
expenses of Noble Haws, a brother, the father of two of the
plaintiffs, in 1941. (TR. 202, Exhibit "7").
Mrs. Haws, the grantor, told several people that she was
going to and later that she had deeded the property to her
daughter, Amber, or as they put it, "gave it to her," because
of the grantee's goodness and financial assistance to her.
In accordance with this a nephew, C. H. Lewis, declared,
"Well, the only conversation I had with her was that she had
given it to Amber because Amber had done so much for her,
that she had sent her money when she was in California and
had come home and taken care of her and that she had given
the property to Amber." (TR. 161, 162).

J

:Jnt

:!

She also made practically the same statement to a niece,
the wife of C. H. Lewis, on more than one occasion. (TR.
167,· 168}.
A neighbor, Raymond Nielsen, reported, "Yes, she just
said that Amber was going to get the place." (TR. 165).
In line with these declarations the grantor deeded the
property to the grantee, and the grantee upon her mother's
death on March 24, 1939, went into exclusive possession of
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9
the property. in question. Upon her marriage to the defendant
it beca~e their home and they held it out to the world as
such and they lived in it together until her death, March 16,
1945. a period of nearly seven years, paying the taxes. During
that period the grantee not only held ou.t to the world and to
the plaintiffs herein that the property was hers and the home
of her and her husband, the defendant, but in keeping. with
such declarations she and the defendant improved the property.
They straightened out and moved back a corral, leveled th~
lot north of the house, pulled trees out on the southeast side
of the house, planted an orchard of trees on the southeast
corner of the lot• south of the barn, planted some berries,
shingled the shanty, put a roof over the cellar and a cement
floor in it, had the inside walls stuccoed, built a building in
front of the cellar for an entrance and planted some hay. This
was done during the years 1940 and 1941. (TR. 63, ~4, 173,
1'74, 183, 185, 210, 212, 216).
In 1935 the property was conveyed to Cache County,
Utah under a tax deed because of failure to pay the taxes
assessed thereon. Pursuant to which the grantor wrote the
grantee telling her that the property was being sold for taxes
and if she didn't send her $100.00 to pay them it would be
sold. The grantee sent up $100.00 to pay taxes, upon payment
of which Cache County conveyed property back to the grantee
by quitclaim deed on the 29th of May, 1936. (TR. 182, 183,
Exhibit "2", Entry 16).
The transaction with the county was handled by Garland
Haws, one of the plaintiffs, and although he admitted handling
the transaction and paying to Cache County the $100.00 he
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did not remember from whom it came. He did not deny that
it came from Amber Haws, the grantee. (TR. 253).
A few weeks before Amber Haws Jensen's death, she
and the defendant made a trip to California where they visited
with Mrs. Rose and Mrs. Ballam, two of the plaintiffs, and
about the time and the grantee and her husband were leaving
California to return to Utah, they asked why she didn't sell
her home in Hyrum, Utah, and move to California, buying
a home there. (TR. 190, 191).
The defendant and Amber, his wife, the grantee lived on
the property from the date of their marriage, April 8, 1939,
until her death on March 16, 1945, during which time none
of the plaintiffs nor any other person claimed any interest in
the property. All of them knew that they were living there
and had taken exclusive possession. Mrs. BaHam, one of the
plaintiffs, and her husband visited them in 1940 and 1941.
(TR. 63, 125, 126, 135, 185).

~;

:J

~..:
;:t

:r
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As noted before, the grantee resided in California from
1919 until 1937 when she returned home to take care of her
mother, the grantor, and thus she was a resident of that state
at both the time of the execution of the deed and delivery of
the deed. The deed was recorded at the instance of the mother,
not by the grantee but by one of the plaintiffs. (TR. 112, 113,
150).
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the grantee ever
had any knowledge that her mother intended to or had conveyed
the property to her until after delivery of the deed, that she
ever induced her mother by action or suggestion to deed the
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property to her, or that she ever made any promise to her
mother whatsoever as a condition to her receiving the property.
There is no evidence that she knew or was advised by her
mother or anyone else that the property was to be taken
subject to any condition whatsoever. (TR. 50, 51, 55, 60,
66, 73, 76, 81, 91, 93, 96, 97, 108, 114, 115, 117, 130, 142,
149, 150, 151, 152, 156, 159, 161, 162, 164, 165, 167, 168,
181, 182, 183, 184, 190, 193, 194).
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
1. The Court erred in overruling the defendant's general
demurrer to plaintiff's complaint, for by the demurrer the
defendant raised the Statute of Fraud and the complaint on
its face showed that plaintiffs were declaring on an express
and not upon a constructive trust.

2. The Court erred in overruling the defendant's objection to the introduction of any parol evidence for the reason
that the plaintiffs complaint showed on its face that they had
declared on an express trust and that it was within the Statute
of Frauds.
Before the introduction of any parol evidence,
defendant made the following objection:

the

"Mr. L .D. Daines: Just a minute. At this time we
object to the introduction of any parol testimony for
the purpose of attempting to alter this deed or i~po~e
a trust on this property, for the reason that the plamtlff
in this case has now pleaded an express trust and such
other testimony is contrary to the Statute of Frauds.
We make further objection on the grounds that they
failed to plead a cause of action.
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The Court: You may answer.
ruled.

The objection is over-

Mr. Daines: If the Court please, may we have a ruling
that it goes to all the testimony?
The Court: Yes, the record may show that the objection will go to all the testimony along this line." (Tr.
49).
There was no documentary evidence introduced whatsoever, signed either by the grantor or the grantee which by its
terms created a trust.
3. That the Court erred in admitting the following testi-mony of the plaintiff's witness, A. A. Savage, to which the defendant duly objected .

.. By Mr. Bell.
Q. I ask you whether or not you have had any conversation with Maria Haws concerning this property?
A. I did on one occasion.
Q. And when was that occasion?
A. It was in the month of February, 1935 * * *
Q. And where did the conversation take place?
A. In her home.
Q. And who was present at the time?
A. Well, I couldn't tell you whether there was anyone
else other than her, I couldn't. I can't remember that.

***
Q. Will you give us the nature of that conversation?
Mr. L. D. Daines: We object at this time to any testimony on the grounds that this conversation is after
the delivery of the deed.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
The Court: You may answer

***

Q. Continue on with the conversation.
A. I asked her if we should send this-this attached
notice sent to Amber, and she says "No, send it here."
Says 'I transferred the property to Amber, thought she
might gest take care of it in dividing it up when I die."
(Tr. 72-73).
The deed was delivered August 2, 1933 (Tr. 4).
4. That the Court erred in admitting the following testimony of the witness Nora Neilsen, to which the defendant
duly objected.
By Mr. Young:

Q. Did you discuss or have any conversation with Mrs.
Haws during her lifetime with respect to the matter
of her property?
A. Y~s, sir.
Q. Can you tell us when the last conversation took
place that you recall ? Could you fix some definite
time?
A. Well, I couldn't give you a definite time. But I
could give you probably the year * * * It was probably
in 1935. * * *
Mr. L. D. Daines: We object at this time on the
grounds the evidence shows the conversation was subsequent to the execution of the deed. * * *

Q. What I wanted to inquire about was that last conversation you recall having with her or hearing her
talk about her property.
A. Well, that took place at my own home right on the
porch. We were sitting on the porch and she told me-.
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Q. Just a minute before that. Do you recall when that
was?
A. Well, I think it was about 1935 * * *
Q. Allright, now what did she say?
A. Well she says: "Vera," she says, "I am going tc
fix my property so that Amber will take care of it.
And when I pass away I want her to keep the old home
for the children that they will have a gathering place
to come," and she says, "I know that Amber will do
that because she is fair and just." And by the way,
at that time she was the only single member of the
family." (Tr. 88-91).
This witness has changed her testimony to "She had fixed
the deed."
The deed was delivered August 2, 1933 (Tr. 4).
5. That the Court erred in admitting the following testimony of the witness Hermoine Rose, one of the plaintiffs, to
which the defendant duly objected:
By Mr. Bell:

Q. I will ask you if you ever had any conversation
between Amber and any members of your family regarding this property.
A. Yes, we had-.
Mr. L. D. Daines: Just a minute-.
The Court: Same objection; same ruling."
The defendant objected to the witness's husband, Lawrence Rose, testifying for the reason:
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:Mr. L. D. Daines. ~' e object on the grounds thal
it is incompetent for this man to testify under the Dead
~fen's Statute."
The objection of counsel as the record reflects was to have
been the .same objection as imposed to the testimony of the
husband of the witness to testify.
By lv!r. Bell:

Q. Will you state the nature of the conversation that
took place at that time?
A. Well, Amber was very sick at the time and my sister
· Mrs. Ballam, and her husband and my daughter-inlaw, Arlene Rose and Mr. Jensen was there and she was
crying. It was just a day or two before they had to
leave to return to Hyrum or for Utah and she said
they hoped to come back, and my sister asked her why
she didn't sell th_e old place. We would give her permission, and there would be-and it would be allright
with us. She could sell it and come down there so we
could all be together and she said, "No, she would not
sell the home." Mother's wish was that it remained
the way it was so there would be a home for someone.
At that time Mr. Jensen said they did not care to sell,
and she told him it was not any of his affair." (Tr.
130, 140-142).

6. The Court erred in admitting the following testimony
of the witness, Lucinda H. Ballam, one of the plaintiffs:
By Mr. Young: .
Now, Your Honor, this witness, of course, is a daughter of the decedent, Maria, and a sister of the decedent,
Amber Haws-and we also offer to prove the conversation between this witness and her sister, the grantee
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in the deed, as to the conversation between them. Now
I suppose it raises the question as to whether or not
the evidence is admissible under the so-called Dead
Men's Statute. * * *
The Court: You may put on her testimony subject to
their objection.
Q. Now, did you ever have any talk with your sister
Amber. about the matter ?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. When did you talk to her?
A. Well, we talked of it in my home in California;
she said that- * * *

Q. What did Amber say?
A. She said the place was her home. We should
all feel free to come home any time we wanted to, that
it was ours as much as hers, and any of our children
would be welcome there. When we got through with
it, if she ever sold it, why, the intention was that we
should have our share--.
Q. Were you present at the home of your sister, .Mrs.
Rose, one time when Mr. Jensen and your sister
Amber was there?
A. Yes, I was * * *

Q. Allright. Now, what was the substance of that conversation, in Mr. Jensen's presence?
A. Only that Mrs. Rose here--we were all talking
· here. We were sitting in the front room and Mr. and
Mrs. Rose and Mr. Jensen and Amber and I were
there, and she was not feeling a bit well and she was
crying. She said she hated to go back to Hyrum. "Why
don't you sell out and come back here and have a
home? We would like to be together." We had been
separated so much. She said, "I will never sell the
place because mother wanted it for all the children
and that's the way it's going to stay." At that time
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Mr. Jensen said something about wanting to sell it
and she said, "You keep still. This is nothing to do
with you. You won't get anything out of it." (Tr.
146-148, 150-152).
7. That the Court erred in finding that prior to and at

the time of the execution of the deed, and at the time of
recording and delivery thereof, the grantor, Maria Anderson
Haws, intended that the grantee thereof, the said Amber
Haws Jensen, would take and hold said property as trustee
for the use and benefit of the heirs of Maria Anderson Haws.
That Amber Haws Jensen paid no consideration whereof for
the said property, that the said Amber Haws Jensen accepted
said deed in accordance with the terms and provisions of said
trust, if any, and thereby agreed to take legal title to said
property .as trustee for the use and benefit of the said heirs
at law of the said Maria Anderson Haws upon her death for
the reason:
(a) That it is contrary to the Statute of Frauds and based
on parol testimony; and/or that there is no evidence to support
.the finding; and/or that it is against the weight and perponderance of the testimony; and/or that the plaintiff failed to prove
that the deed was delivered to the grantee unconditionally and
without reservations by evidence which clearly, definitely, unequivocably and conclusively proved that the deed in question
was
taken conditionally and subject to a trust, if any.
1
(b) That said finding is indefinite in that it cannot be
ascertained therefrom, together with other findings in the
record, what were the terms of the trust, if any. That there
are no facts found therein which would establish a trust.
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8. That the Court erred in finding that the conveyance

of the property to the grantee while in the form of a Warranty
Deed was a trust, and that the grantor executed said deed for
the purpose of avoiding probate proceedings and that Maria
Anderson Haws intended to create a trust for the heirs while
living and after her death for the use and benefit of the heirs
at law of Maria Anderson Haws, for the reason that it is within
the Statute of Frauds based on parol testimony; and/or that
there is no evidence to sustain the finding; and/or that it is
contrary to the weight and preponderance of the testimony;
and/or that it is not based upon clear, definite, unequivocable
and conclusive proof; and/or that it is so indefinite that it
cannot be ascertained what were the elements of trust, if any.
9. That the Court erred in finding that John P. Jensen,
the defendant, received legal title to the property as trustee,
subject to the terms of the trust, if any, created by Maria
Anderson Haws, for the reason that it is within the Statute
of Frauds based on parol testimony; and/or that it is contrary
to the weight and preponderance of the testimony; and/or
that such trust, if any, was not established by clear, definite,
unequivocable and conclusive proof.
10. That the Court erred in finding that the defendant
as a fraud upon the plaintiffs in full knowledge of the acceptance of the trust, if any, refused· to recognize the validity of the
trust, if any, and claimed said property by right of succession,
free and clear of said trust, if any, and equities of said trust,
if any, for the reason that it is within the Statute of Frauds
based on parol testimony; and/or that there is no evidence to
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sustain the finding; and/or that It IS contrary to the weight
and preponderance of the testimony; and/or that it is not based
upon clear, definite and unequivocable and conclusive proof.
11. That the Court erred in making and entering its Con-

clusions of Law that Amber Haws Jensen took the property in
trust and not as an absolute conveyance, and that at the time
of her death she held said property in trust for the use
and benefit of the heirs at law of Maria Anderson Haws, and
that the beneficial title to the property is veste~ in the heirs
at law of .Niaria Anderson Haws, and that the plaintiffs are
entitled to have a trustee appointed to succeed said Amber
Haws .Jensen and the said John P. Jensen as trustee of said
property, and that the said John P. Jensen should convey his
legal title to said successor trustees, for the reason that the
findings of fact do not support the conclusion of law andjor
there is no evidence to sustain the findings; andjor that the
findings are against the weight and preponderance of the
testimony; and/or that the plaintiffs failed to establish by
clear, definite, unequivocable and conclusive proof any trust
whatsoever; and/or that such trust, if any, was within the
Statute of Frauds; and/or that the said findings are indefinite
and ambiguous in that they have failed to describe the terms
of the said trust, if any; and/or that if the terms of said trust,
if any, are definitely established, that the said John P. Jensen
is the sole heir at law of Maria Anderson Haws and is
entitled to one-sixth interest in said property.
12. That the Court erred in entering its order and decree

wherein it ordered and adjudged that Amber Haws Jensen
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held the property in question in trust until her death on March
16, 1945, for the use and benefit of the heirs at law of Maria
Anderson Haws, and that John P. Jensen received legal title
to said property as said trustee, subject to the terms of the
trust, if any, created by Maria Anderson Haws, and that the
defendant John P. Jensen as a fraud upon the plaintiffs in
full knowledge of the acceptance of said trust, if any, now
refuses to recognize the validity of the trust, if any, and
claims that said property by the right of succession free and
clear of said trust, and all of the equities therein, and that
it is necessary that a successor trustee to the defendant be
appointed, and in appointing Vera Haws as trustee of the
property in question, for the use and benefit of the heirs of
Maria Anderson Haws and in ordering that the defendant quit
claim of all of his right, title and interest in said property to

.:::.f

,iJ(

the trustee, for the reason that the findings of fact and conclusions do not sustain the decree that there is no evidence
to sustain the findings; andjor that the findings are against

·')t

the weight and preponderance of the testimony; and/or that

~r

the plaintiffs failed to establish by clear, definite, unequivocable
and conclusive proof any trust whatsover; and/or that such
trust, if any, was within the Statute of Frauds; and/or that
the said findings are indefinite and ambiguous in that they
have failed to describe the terms of the said trust, if any;
and/or that if the terms of said trust, if any, are definitely
established and supported by the evidence that the said John
J. Jensen is the sole heir at law of Amber Haws Jensen and
is entitled to a one-sixth interest in said property.
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13. That the Court erred in failing to find that··the property was deeded to the grantee by the grantor unconditionally
and without any reservations whatsoever and in failing to
enter its judgment and decree in favor of the defendant and
against the plaintiff, decreeing that the defendant received
the property in question free and clear of .all claims and
demands of the plaintiffs, for the reason that the grantee
received the ·conveyance unconditionally and not subject to
any trust; and/or that if there is any trust it is within the
Statute of Frauds; and/or that there is no evidence to establish
that the deed was conveyed conditionally and subject to a
trust; andjor that no trust was established by the weight and
preponderance of the testimony; and/or that no trust was
established by clear, definite, unequivocable and conclusive
proof.
14. If there was a trust the court, nevertheless, erred in
failing to find the defendant, as the sole heir at law of Amber
Haws Jensen, the grantee, was entitled to a one-sixth interest
in the property in ·question.
15. That the Court erred in failing to find that plaintiffs'
cause of action, if any, was barred by sub-paragraph 3 of 1042-24, U.C.A. 1943,-the Statute of Limitations, for the reason
that if a trust, if any, was established, it was repudiated by
the grantee more than three years preceding the commence:.
ment of this action, and that the plaintiffs had notice of such
repudiation.
16. That the Court erred in failing to find that plaintiffs'
cause of action, if any, was within the Statute of Frauds, and
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unenforceable, for the reason that if a trust, if any, it was
established by parol evidence and that the plaintiffs were
declaring upon an express trust.
ARGUMENT
It is the contention of the defendant that the court's decree
imposing a constructive trust is contrary to the law and evidence .
for the following reasons:

,::1(

1. That the court erred in overruling defendant's general

demurrer to plaintiffs' complaint for the demurrer raised the
question of the Statute of Frauds and plaintiffs' complaint on its
face showed that they were declaring on an express oral trust
and not upon a constructive trust, and that the plaintiffs' cause
of action was within the Statute of Frauds.

':.01

2. That the court erred in overruling defendant's objection

to the introduction of any parol evidence for the reason that
plaintiffs' complaint on its face showing that they were declar·
ing on an express trust and that it was within the Statute of
Frauds.
3. That the court erred in admitting plaintiffs' witnesses
to testify as to self-serving declarations of the grantor not in
the presence of the grantee and made after the delivery of
the deed in disparagement of the title conveyed.
4. That the court erred in permitting two of the plaintiffs
to testify over defendant's objection as to conversation with
the deceased grantee regarding the transaction in dispute.
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5. That there is no evidence to sustain the court's findings
of fact that the grantee took the property subject to any con-.
ditions for the use and benefit of the grantor's heirs, and that
in any event the conveyance is within the Statute of Frauds
and void.
6. It is defendant's further position that the plaintiffs
failed to prove by preponderance of the evidence and by clear,
certain, definite, unequivocal and conclusive proof that the
grantee took the deed subject to any conditions whatsoever.
7. That in the event there was a trust created the court,

nevertheless, erred in directing the defendant to convey all
of his right, title and interest in the property to a trustee for
the reason that as sole heir of the grantee he was entitled to
whatever interest she had in the property, or one-six interest.
8. That in any event the plaintiffs' cause of action if any
is barred by the Statute of Limitations, sub-section 3, 104-2-24
U.C.A. 1943 for the reason that if a trust existed it was repudiated by grantee more than three ·years prior to the commencement of this action.

THE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING DEFENDANT'S GENERAL DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT AS THE COMPLAINT ON ITS FACE SHOWED
THAT PLAINTIFFS HAD DECLARED ON AN EXPRESS
ORAL TRUST AND THAT IT WAS WITHIN THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
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To plaintiffs' complaint defendant filed a general de.
murrer, alleging that it did not state a cause of action, and
that it was barred by .33-1-5 U.C.A: and other section applicable thereto statute of frauds. The demurrer was argued
and overruled. (TR. 7, 35). At the beginning of the trial
the defendant further objected to the introduction of any
oral testimony stating the reason that plaintiff had pleaded
an express trust, that such was contrary to the Statute of
frauds, and that the plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of
action. The objection was overruled. (TR. 49).
The complaint recited that they were declaring on an oral
trust, stating, ''That the conveyance of said property to the
said Amber Haws Jensen while in the form of a warranty
deed was intended to create an o1'al trust'' (TR. 4) and having
pleaded an express oral trust they failed to set forth any facts
whatsoever that would take it out of the statute of frauds.
No constructive trust was alleged. There are no allegations
of confiqential relationship, fraud, misrepresentation, or any
other matter that would establish a constructive trust. (TR.
3, 6).
The statute of frauds may be raised by demurrer, where
it appears on the face of the complaint, that the plaintiff is
declaring or an express oral trust.
The Supreme Court of California in the case of Barr v.
O'Donnell 18 P. 429 said:

"If land be conveyed by an absolute deed, no express
trust in favor of the grantor can be raised by proof of
a parol agreement by the grantee to hold the property
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in trust or convey it. * * * And if it appears on the
face of the complaint that the alleged trust rests in
a parol agreement to reconvey, the defense of statute
of frauds may be taken advantage of on demurrer."
To the same effect see: 1Iick v. Butler 256 P. 159; Moynihan v. Murphy 1--!8 N. E. 380; Oglesby v. Wilmerding, Morris
& Mitchell 99 S. E. 29; Wright v. Young 176 P 583; Howard
'"· Foskett- 189 P. 396; Bogert, Trusts and Trustees Vol. 1.
Sec. 71. 280.
And Bogert, in his work on Trusts and Trustees, Vol. 1
Sec. 70 p. 276 sets forth that either the trustee or his successor
in interest or title can take advantage of the Statute of Frauds.
He said:
The seventh section of frauds was enacted to prevent
trust obligations being fastened upon parties through
parol testimony which is subject to the danger of
fraud, perjury and mistake. It would seem, therefore,
that only those who will escape obligations and duties
by means of setting up the statute should be allowed
to take this advantage. The trustee obviously comes
under onerous duties by means of a trust. He of all
persons ought to be allowed the protection of the
statute, so that his title to realty, which appears on the
face of it to be absolute, shall not be encumbered and
burdened by a doubtful trust, and he himself shall not
lightly be placed in a fiduciary position requiring extreme good faith and much diligence. The trustee and
his successors in title to the trust property by way of
intestacy, transfer by will, or transfer inter-vivos, are
allowed to plead the statute of frauds and defeat the
enforcement of the oral trust."
The court had befort it 33-5-1 U.C.A., 1943, which reads:
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No estate or interest in real property, other than leases
for a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or
power over or concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned,
surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or
operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing
subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning,
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful
agen.t thereunto authorized by writing."
Also sec. 33-5-3 U.C.A. 1943 which reads as follows:
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than
one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest
in lands, shall be void. unless the contract, or some note
or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by
the party by whom the lease or sale is to be made, or
by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing.
As previously pointed out, the plaintiffs are declaring
on an express oral trust, and they pleaded no facts that would
· take the oral trust out of the statute of frauds. A constructive
trust was not alleged. They did not allege any fraud, misrepresentation, breach of a confidential relationship, or any
other elements necessary to create a constructive trust.
The Supreme Court of Kansas, in the case of Mick v.
Butler, 158 P. 256, supra, held that defendant's demurrer to
plaintiff's complaint was good for the reason that the complaint
on its face showed that it was an express oral trust and within
the statute of fraud. The plaintiff alleged that both she
and the defendant were members of the same church, of
which the defendant was a leading member, that she orally
agreed with him that she would turn over to him a certain
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lot for the benefit of the church on the condition that if the
building ceased to be used for church purposes that it would
revert to her. That the defendant orally accepted the trust
and with it the sales contract which she had of the property
and that on June, 1921, she gave the defendant seventy-five
dollars with which to make final payment on the property;
that he converted the property to his own use. In sustaining
the general demurrer, the court said:

" * * * The pleading sets

up an express trust created
by oral contract. The fiduciary relations arise by reason
of this express oral contract, and the fiduciary character
of the transaction is alleged to have been created by
the very contract upon which the cause of action is
based. It is not a case of fiduciary relations already
existing and a trust created by law or a resulting trust.
It sets up an express trust created by oral contract, and
this is squarely interdicted by our statute. Therefore
the court believes that the statement of such a trust is
not the statement of a legal obligation, and that therefore the demurrer is well taken on that ground."

In the Massachusetts case of Moynihan v. Murphy 148
N. E. 380, supra, the plaintiff alleged that the grantor conveyed
property to her daughter, the grantee, upon her agreement to
hold it for herself and sisters, keep it in repair, pay the liens
thereon, and provide a home for the mother during her lifetime. That the plaintiff remained in possession after the
grantee's marriage to the defendant, supported the mother,
and paid the taxes thereon. The husband of the deceased
grantee and administrator of her estate raised the statute of
fraud by demurrer. The Court, sustaining the demurrer, said:
"No trust can be created by oral statements or agree-
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ments by either Margaret or Annie T. Moynihan * * *
Nor do the facts alleged support a constructive trust.
No fraud was practiced on Margaret Moynihan. Annie
T. Moynihan made no representation and no promises
to any of the plaintiffs so far as the bill shows."
In the Georgia case of Oglesby v. Wilmerding, Morris
Mitchell 99 S. E. 29 plaintiffs alleged that George B.
Lumpkin, father of T. B. Lumpkin, died, leaving a widow,
four children and tract of land. They sold the land, paid the
debts, and has $4000 remaining. They agreed that the $4000
should be held in trust by T. B. Lumpkin, charged with the
duty of paying to Mrs. Lucy .A. Lumpkin, the interest on the
same at 8lfo during her lifetime, and on her death, the $4000
was to be divided equally among the four children; that T.
B. Lumpkin did take the $4000 under these terms and conditions, and paid Mrs. Lucy A. Lumpkin the interest on the
same up to the time of her death which occurred March 21,
1909 and paid certain small sums to petitioner, reducing her
debt to $963. The Court said:

&

"We are of the opinion that the Court properly sustained the general demurrer to that part of the petition
which seeks to have the debt due the petitioner given
a priority as a trust. If the verbal agreement under
which T. B. Lumpkin took charge of the fund of $4000
created a trust, it was an express trust, and under the
provisions of our law, all express trusts must be created
in WRITING."
In the Oregon case of Howard V. Foskett, 189 P. 396,
the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's husband conveyed
the property to her upon her verbal agreement that if she
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survived him that she would convey the property to the
plaintiffs reserving in herself a life estate that in reliance of
said verbal promises to said Alice S. Foskett and believing same
to be true and in consideration thereof her husband consented
to the execution of the deeds. That the Court said:
"The rule is universal that a parol declaration of a
trust will not affect the land, and for this reason parol
evidence is inadmissible to establish such a trust. In
Fairchild vs. Rasdall, 9 Wis. 379, the court, speakin'g
of the universality of this rule, say: 'We do not feel
called upon to cite authorities to show that, in the
·absence of fraud, accident, or mistake, parol evidence
cannot be received to prove that a deed, absolute on
its face, was given in trust for the benefit of the
grantor.' "
In the Arizona case of Wright v. Young 176 P. 584,
the plaintiffs alleged that the mother of plaintiffs and of Mary
S. Wright died March 31, 1908, intestate, seized of certain
lands; that the plaintiffs and Mary S. Wright were and now
are the sole heirs of their mother; that Mary S. Wright married
the defendant on November 20, 1911; that on April 18, 1908,
they deeded their interest in the property to Mary S. Wright,
it being mutually agreed that she would accept, take and hold
the title to the property for the purpose of making a sale;
that she could occupy, keep in repair, and pay the taxes on the
property, and that as soon as the premises were sold, the
proceeds were to be divided among the plaintiffs; that she
died April 4, 1915, and her husband, the defendant, refuses
to carry out the terms of the agreement. The husband raised
the statute of frauds by demurrer. The Court said:
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"There are decisions to the contrary, but we think the
better rule is that where the deed is absolute upon its
face, as in the instant case, and where the pleadings
and the evidence both show an express trust, and where
there is no allegation of facts in the complaint showing
fraud, duress, or undue influence, the grantor ought
not to be allowed by parol evidence to ingraft upon
his own deed a trust in his o~n favor as against the
terms of his own deed. The stability of titles rests
largely upon written instruments, and to protect titles
this rule in reason ought to prevail.

" * * * The pleadings in plaintiffs' amended complaint
contain no allegations of fact showing fraud, misrepresentations, concealments, undue influence, duress, or
that any undue advantage was taken of the plaintiffs by
reason of weakness or necessities which would render
the taking of the property by the said Mary S. Wright
unconscientious. The pleadings wholly fail to show
a constructive trust; but, on the contrary, they show
an express trust, and the evidence establishes an express
trust. When the pleadings and the evidence both show
an express trust, the grantor in a deed duly executed
and delivered cannot impress or ingraft by parol a
trust in his favor against the terms of his own deed."
The decisions of this Court, we believe are in line with
the foregoing authorities. For in the case of Chadwick v.
Arnold, 34 Utah 48, 95P. 527, in an opinion by Justice Straup,
laid down the rule that a constructive trust only arises by means
of an intentional false or fraudulent verbal promise to hold
property for a certain purpose. The Court quoted Sec. 1056
3 Porn. Eq. Jur. (3rd edition) as follows:
"The foregoing cases should be carefully distinguished
from those in which there is a mere verbal promise
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to purchase and convey land. In order that the doctrin of trusts ex maleficio with respect to land may
be enforced under any circumstances, there must be
something more than a mere verbal promise, however
unequivocal. otherwise the statute of frauds would be
virtually abrogated; there must be an element of positive
fraud accompanying the promise, and by means of
which the acquisition of the legal title is wrongfully
consummated. Equity does not pretend to enforce
verbal promises in the face of the statute; it endeavors
to prevent and punish fraud by taking from the wrongdoer the fruits of his deceit, and it accomplishes this
object by its beneficial and far-reaching doctrine of
constructive trusts.'·
And we do not find any subsequent case which varies
the rule. The case of Jeppson v. Erdmann, 209 P. 203, does
not, as the decision is only authority for the proposition that
the mere wish by the grantor that the grantee would make
certain disposition of the property, did not establish a constructive trust. Furthermore, it does not appear that the case
of Hansen v. Hansen, 171 P. 2, 392 varies the rule announced
in the case of Chadwick v. Arnold, supra, as it appears to be
only authority for the rule that the mere expression of an
intention to create a trust, and the contemplation that something more is to be done, such does not create a trust! It
would thus seem that these cases are further authority for
the proposition that the plaintiffs did not state a cause of
action, for there is .no allegation whatsover that the grantee
made any intentional fraudulent promise or any other promise
to the grantor as a condition for the conveyance.
It is true that an early Utah case of Haite v. Pearson,
39 P. 497 held that a mere breach of promise would raise a
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constructive trust. However, we find no fault with this and
Chadwick v. Arnold, supra, did not depart from it, as in that
case there existed a confidential relationship of attorney and
client, and it was this relationship that layed the foundation
for the rule that breach of promise was sufficient fraud to
raise a constructive trust.
In this respect it should again be noted that plaintiff did
not allege in any manner, whatsoever, that the grantee secured
conveyance of the property upon an intentional false promise.
In fact, there is no allegation that grantee made any promise
to grantor as a condition to the conveyance of the property
to her. There is no allegation of fact showing a confidential
relationship.
That the foregoing is the better rule and is the weight
of authority in this country see Bogert on Trusts and Trustees,
Vol 3, Section 495 and 496.
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE INTRODUCTION OF ANY PAROL TESTIMONY AS THE
PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION IS BASED ON AN
ALLEGED ORAL TRUST.

It is the defendant's 2nd contention, Assignment of
Error No. 2, that the court erred in admitting over defendant's
objection and in the face of his affirmative defense of the
statute of frauds any parol testimony tending to establish an
express oral trust, as the complaint on its face as previously
argued under Assignment of Error No. 1 alleged an express

·~I
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oral trust and failed to allege any facts whatsoever establishing
a constructive trust.
The only evidence regarding the circumstances surrounding the creation of the conveyance and the delivery of the
deed were oral. No instruments in writing were offered or
received, signed by either grantor or grantee tending in any
degree to create a trust.
The court had before it for consideration 33-5-1 and 33-5-3
U. C. A. 1943, supra, for consideration.

The rule applicable here is set forth in JONES ON EVIDENCE-CIVIL CASES, FOURTH EDITION, Vol. 2, § 418,
page 789, as follows:
"By the seventh and eighth sections of the English
statute of frauds, it is provided that declarations or
creations of trusts or confidences in lands shall be
manifested and proved by some writing signed by the
party who is by law enabled to declare such trust, or
by his last will in writing; otherwise they shall be
void. The exception is made, however, as to trusts or
confidences resulting by the implication or construction
of law. In substance at least this provision has been
carried into the statutes of many of the states. Where
this is the case, the statute operates to prevent the
enforcement of an express trust which purports to
have been created in respect of real property by parol."
Thus there is no competent evidence to sustain plaintiff's
cause of action, and all of plaintiff's testimony should have
been excluded.
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THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING OVER DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION PLAINTIFFS' WITNESSES TO
TESTIFY AS TO SELF-SERVING DECLARATIONS OF
THE GRANTOR AFTER THE EXECUTION AND DELIVERY OF THE DEED.
The 3rd contention we wish to urge for the court's consideration is presented by defendant's assignment of error
3 and 4. It is this that the court erred in permitting plaintiffs'
witnesses, A. A. Savage and Nora Nielsen to testify regarding
purported statements of the grantor in disparagement of the
title conveyed since the self -serving declarations were made
after the execution and delivery of the deed and were inadmissible.

The deed was delivered December 2, 1933, and the

purported declarations were supposed to have been made in
1935.
The witness, A. A. Savage testified:
A. "And I asked her if we should send this-have a tax
notice sent to Amber and she said, 'No, send it here,'
says, 'I transferred the property to Amber, thought she
might best take care of it--divide it up when I died.' "
(TR. 73).
The witness, Nora Nielsen, testified:
]

A. Well, she says: "Vera," she says, "I am going to
fix my property so that Amber will take care of it. And
when I pass away I want her to keep the old home for
the children that they will have a gathering place to
come;" and she says, "I know that Amber will do that
because she is fair and just." And by the way, at that
time she was the only single member of the family.''
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Admission of this evidence was tn error for a grantor
cannot, after she has conveyed title to the property, make
statements in disparagement of the title. The editor of
AMERICAN LAW REPORTS, 156 A.L.R. 1335 in an annotation sets forth the rule as follows:
"It is a well-established rule of evidence that the declarations of a person under whom title is claimed are
receivable against the successor so claiming, on the
theory that there is sufficient identity of interest to
render the statements of the former equally receivable
with the admissions of the present owner, and that the
rights of the latter are those· and only those, of the
former.

There is, however, a limitation to this rule as regards
the time when the declaration is made. Declarations
of the grantor made after he has conveyed his interest
in the property cannot, as a rule, be admitted in evidence
against his successor as an ~admission binding on the
latter. After the grantor has executed and delivered
a deed absolute on its face, his declarations reflecting
on the title of his successor are, as far as the rules of
evidence are concerned, in no way different from declarations made by third persons, and, hence, are not
admissible against the grantee."
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING PLAINTIFFS, HERMOINE ROSE AND LUCINDA BALLAM, TO
TESTIFY OVER DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION AS TO
CONVERSATIONS REGARDING THE TRANSACTION
IN DISPUTE WITH THE DECEASED GRANTEE.
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The defendant's 4th contention is that the court erred,
Assignments of Error 5 and 6, in permitting over defendant's
objection, Hermoine Rose and Lucinda Ballam, both plaintiffs,
to testify to conversations purported. to have taken place between
them and the deceased grantee regarding the transaction in
dispute. The declared conversations were equally within the
knowledge of the witnesses and the deceased grantee. The
defendant's title vested in him as an heir of the grantee it

Lu

was distributed to him in probate. He did not claim it in his

And

own right but as an heir of the grantee. In this action is thus
an attempt to assail and reduce the estate from which the
defendant derived his title to the property in question. The
basis of the defendant's title is the integrity of the grantee's
estate from which it was derived.
incompetent to testify.

Thus these witnesses were

Hermoine Rose's testimony regarding

their purported conversations was as follows:
A. "Well, Amber was very sick at the time and my
sister, Mrs. Ballam and her husband and my daughterin-law, Arlene Rose, and J\1r. ]ens en was there and she
was crying. It was just a day or two before they had
to leave to return to Hyrum or for Utah and she said
they hoped to come back, and my sister asked her why
she didn't sell the old place. We would give her our
permission, and there would be-and it would be allright with us. She could sell it and come down there
so we could all be together and she said, ''No, she
would not sell the home." Mother's wish was that it
was so that there would be a home there for someone.
At that time Mr. Jensen said they did not care to sell,
and she told him it was not any of his affair." (Tr.
130, 240-142).
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Lucinda H. BaHam's testimony regarding their p~rporteJ
conversation was as follows:
A. She said the place was her home. We should all
feel free to come home any time we wanted to, that
it was ours as much as hers,· and any of our children
would be welcome there. When we got through with
it, if she ever sold it, why~ the intention was that we
should have our share--.
And Mrs. BaHam again said:
A. Only that Mrs. Rose here--we were all talking he!~e.
\Y/e were sitting in the front room and Mr. and },f rs.
Rose and Mr. Jensen and Amber and I were there, and
she was not feeling a bit well and she was crying. She
said she hated to go back to Hyrum. "Why don't you
sell out and come back here and have a home. \Ve
would like to be together." We had been separated
so much. She said, "I will never sell the place because
mother wanted it for all the children and that's the
way it's going to stay." At that time Mr. Jensen said
something about wanting to sell it and she said, "You
keep still. This is nothing to do with you. You won't
get anything out of it."
The court has before it sub-paragraph (3) 104-49-2 U.C.A.

1943, which reads as follows:
( 3) A party to any civil action, suit or proceeding, and
any person directly interested in the event thereof, and
any person from, through or under whom such party
or interested person derives his interest or title or
any part thereof, when the adverse party in such action,
suit or proceeding claims or opposes, sues or defends,
as guardian of an insane or incompetent person, or as
the executor or administrator, heir, legatee or devisee
of any deceased person, or as guardian, assignee or
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grantee, directly or remotely, of such heir, legatee or
devisee, as to any statement by, or transaction with,
such deceased, insane or incompetent person, or matter
of fact whatever; which must have been equally within
the knowledge of both the witness and such insane,
incompetent person, unless such witness is called to
testify thereto by such adverse party so claiming or
opposing, suing or defending, in such action, suit or
proceeding.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska in the case of Johnson
v. Omaha Loan and Building Ass'n. 257 N. W. 370 held that
where a party is called upon to defend what he obtained from
a deceased person by inheritance he represents the deceased
person within the statute regarding competency of witnesses
and that the plaintiff in such action cannot testify. The court
said:
Section 20-1202, Comp. St. 1929, reads as follows:
"No person having a direct legal interest in the result
of any civil action or proceeding, when the adverse
party is the representative of a deceased person, shall
be permitted to testify to any transaction or conversation had behveen the deceased person and the witness."
The situations in which this statute applies and wherein
a litigant or witness may be said to be "the representative of a deceased person," as contemplated by this
statute, have been the subject of much controversy,
but are quite well settled by the decisions of this
court. It is not necessary that the personale rpresentative
of the deceased in the sense of being the administrator
or executor of the estate be a party. The rule is stated
in McCoy v. Conrad, 64 Neb. 150, 89 N.W. 665, 667,
and cited with approval in McEntarffer v. Payne, 107
Neb. 168, 185 N.W. 329, in thislanguage: "If a party
is so placed in a litigation that he is called upon to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

39

defend that which he has obtained from a deceased
person, and make the defense which the deceased might
have made if living * * * then he may be said, in
that litigation, to represent a deceased person." These
principles apply to the present case and we conclude
that the evidence of the plaintiff in regard to the purported delivery of the passbook was inadmissible.
It would thus appear that the court committed prejudicial
error in admitting in evidence this testimony.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN THE
COURT'S FINDING THAT THE GRANTEE TOOK THE
PROPERTY FOR THE USE AND BENEFIT OF THE
GRANTOR'S HEIRS, AND IN ANY EVENT, IT IS A
TRANSACTION WITHIN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
AND VOID.
It is the defendant's fifth contention, (Assignment of
Erros Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 16) that there is no
evidence to sustain the Court's findings of fact, conclusions of
law and decree, to the effect that the grantee took the deed
subject. to any conditions, with an agreement to hold for the
benefit of the plaintiffs and that the conveyance was for the
purpose of avoiding probate.
Although it is true that some of plaintiff's witnesses
testified that the grantor prior to the delivery of the deed on
the 2nd day of August, 1933, (Tr. 149 and 150) told them that
she had, or was going to, deed the property to the grantee, so
that her daughter on her death could divide it among her
heirs, not witnesses testified that she said that the grantee had
promised or agreed to do so.
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At the time of the execution of the deed in 1927
the grantee was living in Los Angeles, California, . and had
been for eight years, and at the date of its delivery six years
later, she was still living there. The deed was delivered at the
instance of the grantor, she having it recorded. One of the
plaintiffs, Lucinda Ballam, at her mother's request, placed
the deed in the Recorder's Office, Cache County, Utah, for
recording, and her testimony regarding this transaction is as
follows:

Q. Where was Amber at the time?
A.

In California.

Q. How long had she been there?
A.

She had been living in California about seventeen
or eighteen years.

Q.
A.

And who was it handed you this deed?
My mother. She came .out and said, "Lucinda,
I'd like you to take this over and have it recorded."

Q. Did you do that?
A.

Yes.

* * * Yes,

that was in 1933.

Q. Then did you have any talks with your mother
A.

at that time about this deed?
Yes, she said the day she was having it recorded
in Amber's name, as she had said before, she did
not want us to have our feelings hurt because she
wanted to be fair with all of us, and she said
the home would always be there for us if any of
us wanted to come back, that we were welcome
and that after her death it should be divided
equally among all of us, and she was not leaving
it for Amber. It was for all the family. (Tr. 149150)
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11rs. BaHam's husband said he was present at the time
and testified as follows:
A.

Yes, she said she had them fix it in Amber's
name because she was single. All the rest of the
family \Yere married and she felt certain that
Amber would keep the property there for a place
for any of the children to use if they wanted
to come home for any reason, and if it was decided that the property should be disposed of
after her death that she knew that Amber would
make a fair distribution to all the children. (Tr.

114)
In this respect there is some confusion in the record
whether this conversation took place in 1929 or 1933. However, it probably took place in 1933.
This is the only evidence in the record concerning the
statement made by the grantor at the time of the delivery of
the deed, and if it establishes anything, it i_s this, that the
grantee did not induce her mother to convey the property
to her, not did she make any agreement or give a promise as
a condition to the conveyance. Her mother did not say that
Amber had so promised. It negatives any such proposition.
Mrs. Ballam testified as to purported statements made

by the grantor in the year 1927 and the foregoing statement
of her husband, W. P. BaHam was either made in 1929 or 1927.
Yet in neither of these conversations did witnesses testify that
the grantor said that Amber had agreed or promised to hold
the property for the grantee's benefit. They were statements
of a wish only. (Tr. 114-116 and 149.)
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Three other of plaintiffs' witnesses also testified regarding statements made by the grantor prior to the delivery of the
deed. They positively said in the years 1925 or 1926, 1927,
1930 and 1932. Plaintiffs' witnesses were always positive of
the date, no matter how many years had gone by. An analysis
of these witnesses' testimony will also reveal that the grantor
never told them that Amber had induced her mother, by
promise or otherwise, to convey the property .to her, or that
she would make any disposition of the property as a condition
of its conveyance. (Tr. 51, 71, 91, and 92)
The record is silent as to any purported statement made
by the grantee regarding the conveyance until 1934, and both
grantor and grantee were supposed to be present when, according to the witness, W. P. Ballam, she made the following
statement:
A.

Well, the discussion was to the effect that the
property had been left and recorded in Amber's
name here, and that Ma (meaning Mrs. Haws)
has been left-wanted the property to be left
there in case any of the children ever would want
to come back and use the place for vacation
quarters or for a home.

Q.
A.

And what did Amber say?
She said, "Well, that's the way it's going to be
left." (Tr. 115)

Now, certainly, these conversations do not create a trust
for they are nothing more than an expression of a wish, a
wish as to an indefinite something, and a wish, no matter how
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definite, does not create a trust. It is said here that Amber
was to hold for the plaintiffs for their benefit for distribution
upon her mother's death. Jensen vs. Howell, 282 P. 1034, 95
Utah 64; Jeppson vs. Erdmann, 209 P. 203, 60 Utah 543.
Furthermore, this statement negatives any promise or agreement made by the grantee prior to the delivery of the deed
that conditions were imposed. This statement, taken at its
face value, does not relate to any prior understanding or agreement. It negatives any such proposition and certainly it is
the law that a promise made after the acquisition of title does
not create a trust. 65 C. J., page 457, says:
FRAUD AT INCEPTION OF TITLE. In order that
fraud may give rise to a constructive trust, it must
exist at the inception of title to the property, or inhere
in the transaction by which the trustee acquires the
title, and fraudulent acts or omissions subsequent to
the acquisition of title and not connected therewith do
not give rise to a constructive trust. So a constructive
trust ordinarily cannot grow out of the mere violation
of a declaration or agreement of trust, whether implied
or express, written or verbal, nor from a violation of
or refusal to perform a promise to or agreement with
the person seeking to establish the trust to convey
property to him, nor from mere failure to pay the
purchase money, for property conveyed, although where.
the circumstances are such that a constructive trust
would arise in the absence of any agreement, the existence of such an agreement will not prevent a trust
arising. Likewise, a denial that any trust exists, or a
resort to the Statute of Frauds to defeat the enforcement of a parol trust or obligation, is not such a fraud
as to give rise to a constructive trust.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

44
As to the other subsequent statements of either the grantor
or the grantee, none of them in any way should be construed
as establishing an agreement at the time the conveyance was
made. At the most they merely indicate the promise to carry
out the mother's indefinite wish and this a promise made subsequent to the conveyance. (Tr. 51, 52, 67, 80, 81, 117, 130,
131, 142, 151, 152, 156)
Again in this respect we are setting out two conversations
purported to have taken place after the conveyance. In one
instance, both the grantor and grantee were present, and in
the other, the grantee was to have made a statement after
the grantor's death.
Mrs. Laura Garner testified that some time between 1937
and 1939 she was presen~ at a conversation in which the grantor
and grantee took part.
A.

Well, we were talking about what Amber was
going to do with the home after they knew her
mother could not live. And she said, "I have
not decided whether to sell it and divide it or to
go back to California and live there for some time,
for a while. (Tr. 66 and 67)

This conversation indicates definitely that the property
was conveyed to the grantee as her own to do with as she
wished. Her mother imposed no conditions, made no request
and took no exception to what she said. This negatives a
trust. In line with this conversation, shortly after her mother's
death, while in California she was supposed to have made,
according to the witness W. P. Ballam, the following statement:
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A.

I heard her mention several times any time we
wanted to come home and spend a little time or
vacation, or for any other emergency, we wanted
to move in there, she said, "There is alwavs room
for any of us and all of us." She said, ·.. That's
the way Ma wanted it to be left and that's the
way I intend to have it." (Tr. 117)

These testimonies from plaintiffs' witnesses unquestionably
establish that it was given to the grantee without any strings
attached and that she was merely intended to follow out her
mother's wish that her brothers and sisters would always be
welcome in the home.
Now then, where is there any fraud in this case? Even
assuming that there was a promise, there is no evidence of an
intentionally false or fraudulent one. There is no fraud in
the inception of this conveyance.
In any event, plaintiffs' cause of action, both their pleadings and evidence, are within the Statute of Frauds and the
transaction was void. To hold otherwise would virtually abrogate the statute, for, as this Court said in Chadwick v. Arnold,
95 P. 527, 34 Utah 48, supra:
" * * * The foregoing case should be clearly distinguished from those in which there is a mere verbal
promise to purchase and convey land. In order that
the doctrine of trusts ex maleficio with respect to land
may be enforced under any circumstances, there must
be something more than a mere verbal promise, however unequivocable, otherwise the statute of frauds
would be virtually abrogated; there must be an element
of positive fraud accompanying the promise, and by
means of which the acquisition of the legal title is
wrongfully consummated.''
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THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROVE BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE AND BY CLEAR,
CERTAIN, DEFINITE, UNEQUIVOCAL AND CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE THAT THE GRANTEE TOOK THE
DEED SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS.
It is defendant's sixth contention, Assignments of Errors
Nos. 7, 8,·-9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, that plaintiffs' proof falls short
even assuming that their cause of action and evidence is not
within the Statute of Frauds to establish a constructive trust.
Regarding the quantum of proof necessary to establish
a constructive trust this court in the case of Hansen v. Hansen,
171 P. 2nd 382, in an opinion by Justice :McDonough, said:
In all such cases the court will scrutinize parol evidence
with great caution, and the plaintiff must fail unless
it is clear, definite, unequivocal, and conclusive. Public
policy, and the safety and security of titles to real
estate, demand this rule, because such evidence is
offered to overcome the strong presumption, arising
from the terms and conditions of an instrument in
writing, which is always the best evidence of title.
If it were once established that the effect of the terms
of a written instrument could be avoided by a bare
preponderance of parol evidence, the gates to perjury
would soon be wide open, and no person could longer
rest in the security of his title to property, however
solemn might be the instrument on which it was
founded. ' * * * To make such an effort successful, the law, for the safety of titles, requires that the
proof shall be of the most convincing and satisfactory
kind. Nothing short of certain, definite, reliable, and
convincing proof will justify t~e court of divesting
one man of title to lands, evidenced by a regular deed,
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and putting it in another.' l\1idmer v. MiJner's Ex· rs;

26 N.

J. Eq. 299.

As previously pointed out this action was brought 20 years
after the deed was executed, 14 years after its delivery, 9 years
after the grantor's death and 2 years after grantee's death.
There is a direct conflict in the evidence as to what the
intent of the grantor was in conveying the property to the
grantee. In this respect even the plaintiffs' witnesses asserted
two different theories. The first theory being that the grantor
conveyed the property for the purpose of avoiding probate
and that the grantee was to distribute the property to the
grantor's heirs on her death, and the other theory was, and this
was the one pleaded, that she deeded the property so that the
grantee would keep it as a family home for the grantor's
children.

•

Defendant's evidence, and this was consistent with the
use to which the property was put, was to the effect that it
was deeded to the grantee as her sole and separate property,
not subject to any conditions whatsoever. The grantee was
the oldest in a family of six. She was unmarried at the time
of conveyance, she was 39 years of age and had worked all
of her adult life, helping her mother and family financially
over the years, and when her mother became so ill that she
needed care in 193 7 the grantee quit her employment in California and returned to Utah to take care of her mother.
In line with the grantee's help over the years, Mr. Conway
Lewis, a nephew, said the grantor asserted that she had given
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the property to her daughter, Amber, because of her help and
financial assistance over the years. In regard to this, he testified:

Q.

Did you ever have any conversation with Mrs
Haws (that's .Maria Haws) with respect to that
property?

A.

Well the only conversation I had with her was
that she had given it to Amber because Amber
had done so much for her, that she had sent her
money when she was in California and had come
home and taken care of her and that she had given
the property to Amber * * *

A.

Well that would be hard for me to say exactly
what - when it was because - that's all I know
she told me she had given the home to Amber and
it was the understanding that it was hers. (Tr.

161, 162)
This conversation was after Amber had returned home
to take care of her mother.
Mrs. Joyce Lewis, the wife of Conway Lewis, also testified:
A.

At one time we were just joking and we were
talking about deeds and different people leaving
their estates. She just said to me she just hoped
things would be fixed up the way she would like
them to be.

Q. How did she say they were?
A.

She said she thought Amber, her daughter, really
should have the place because she had been so good
to her. She said she had given her clothes and
sent her money to come home and taken care
of her when she was sick and she said, "She's
been one of the very best girls I've known in
my life."
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Q.
.:\.

How long was that before she died?
Five or six years. (Tr. 167, 168)

And lvir. Raymond Nielsen, who lived in Hyrum and
was a friend of the family, said:

Q.
A.
A.

* * * did Mrs. Haws ever talk to you in any
way about her property?
Yes, she just said that Amber was going to get
the place * * * .
Well it was before Amber came up to live. I don't
know just what year it was. (Tr. 165)

Mrs. Beda Petersen, a neighbor of Mrs. Haws and the
grantee testified that after her marriage that Amber told her
that, "Well, she stated the home was hers and that she intended
to build a home on the south side." (Tr. 173)
In line with these declarations that the grantor deeded
the property to the grantee, the grantee upon her mother's death
on March 24, 1939, went into exclusive possession of the
property. Upon her marriage to the defendant it became
their home and they held it out to the world as such. They
lived in it until her death, March 16, 1945, nearly 7 years, and
during this period none of the plaintiffs ever asserted any rights
in the property. And had the grantee lived they undoubtedly
would still be occupying it. Not only did they occupy the property but they improved it as hereinbefore mentioned. The use was
in line with unconditional ownership. (Tr. 63, 64, 173, 174,
183, 185, 210, 216)
It is difficult to understand plaintiffs' position that they
claimed any interest in the property and that it was deeded by
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their mother to their sister in order to avoid probate in view
of the fact that they permitted her together with her husband
to occupy it for 7 years without asserting any interest therein.
Acquiescence in this occupation was not consistent with the
position they took when they formed a delegation and called
on the defendant two or three days after his wife's funeral
to make demands on him that he turn the property over to them.
Although they said the property was theirs they never stated
that their mother had conveyed the property to Amber for
the purpose of avoiding probate and that she had promised
her mother to divide it with them. (Tr. 120, 121, 127, 132,
138, 142, 143)

That Amber had been of great help to her family from
the time she started working as an adult is apparent, not only
from the testimony of the defendant's witnesses but from the
plaintiffs' also, and this is further indicated by the fact that
she paid the funeral expenses of Noble Haws, the father of
the plaintiffs in 1941. Although one of the plaintiffs testified
that the money for the paying of the funeral expenses of the
brother came from money her mother had saved, it would
appear that such is most unlikely for during these years she
was being taken care of by the Welfare Department. As a
matter of fact, the Welfare Department paid $75.00 towards
her own burial. (Tr. 161, 167, 168, 171, 199, 201; Exhibit 6)
These facts alone would indicate that the conveyance of
this property to her daughter, Amber, was without any conditions whatsoever and entirely in line with the testimony as
given by defendant's witnesses, to the effect that the grantee's
mother had given her the property.
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Another outstanding piece of evidence in this case that
makes it definitely appear that the property was given to
the grantee without any conditions being attached: That is in
1935 the property was sold to Cache County for failure to pay
the taxes assessed thereon, pursuant to which the grantor wrote
to the grantee telling her that the property was being taken
over by the county, that if she didn't send her $100.00 to pay
the taxes that it would be sold. She sent the money for this
purpose, and the county, on its payment, conveyed the property
back to the grantee, by quitclaim deed on the 29th of !viay,
1936. (Tr. 182, 183; Exhibit 2, entry 16)
Garland Haws, one of the plaintiffs, testified that he
handled this transaction with the county. In this respect he
testified:
Q. Who paid that $100.00?
A. I paid it.

Q.
A.

Did you receive any part of it from Amber Haws
Jensen?
I don't remember as I did. I wouldn't be sure
but I don't remember. (Tr. 253)

This is not a denial of the defendant's testimony that
the grantee sent the $100.00. If anything, it is an admission.
If Garland Haws had paid the money himself he would have
remembered it. This was in a day when $100.00 had some
purchasing power.
Another surprising thing about this case is that the plaintiffs, Hermoine Rose and Lucinda Ballam, until after the
death of their sister were residents of California, and yet it
was from these witnesses and their husbands that came all of
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the testimony of the plaintiffs themselves regarding. purported
conversations with their mother and Amber, the grantee, about
this transaction. None of the evidence regarding the conveyance
came. from their brother, Garland Haws, who lived in the
same town as his mother, an~ his sister, the grantee, after she
had returned to care for her mother. Yet he did not testify
regarding any conversation with either grantee or grantor,
whatsoever. You can search his testimony from one end to t~e
other and you will not find any testimony by him· regarding the
transaction in question. It is indeed strange that neither his
mother nor sister discussed with him the particulars of this
conveyance. Especially is this true in view of the fact that h~
handled the transaction wherein, in effect, he redeemed the
property in question for his sister, the grantee. Certainly he
must have asked his mother why the property had been ·~on
veyed to his sister. His silence must speak that any answer
would have been fatal to his cause. (Tr. 135-140, 252, 256)
IF THERE WAS A TRUST THE COURT ERRED IN
ORDERING THE DEFENDANT TO CONVEY ALL OF
HIS RIGHT, TITLE AND INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY
TO A TRUSTEE BECAUSE AS AN HEIR TO THE GRAN-·
TEE HE IS ENTITLED TO A ONE-SIXTH INTEREST
IN THE PROPERTY.
It is the defendant's seventh contention, Assignments of
Error No. 11, 12 and 14, that the findings of fact are so uncertain and indefinite that it cannot be determined what trust,
if any, was created by the actions of the parties and what
interest, if any, the plaintiffs and the defendant have in the
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property m question. In the first instance, the court found
that the grantee took the property for the use and benefit of
the heirs of the grantor on her death; however, it failed to
find the respective interests the heirs were entitled to. It then
found that the purpose of the conveyance was to avoid probate.
In line with these findings it entered its conclusions of law
and decree appointing a trustee and ordering the defendant
to deed to the trustee all of his right, title and interest in the
property. (Tr. 26-30)
It would thus appear that the court, although it found the
purpose of the trust was to avoid probate. it nevertheless finds
and decrees that the only heirs who had any interest in the
property were the heirs of the grantor and that any interest the
defendant might have had as an heir of the grantee was foreclosed, else why did the court require him to deed all of his
interest in the property to a trustee? This is contrary to the
law and the facts.
The interest of the various parties in the property should
be determined in this action. Another one for this purpose
should not be necessary. If the grantee held this property in
trust for her mother's heirs for distribution on the grantor's
death, then as a grantee, being her mother's heir she would be
entitled to one-sixth interest therein, and this interest has now
passed to the defendant. Under any theory of the case he
is entitled to have the court decree that he has a one-sixth
interest in the property and the court unquestionably erred in
ordering that he convey all of his right, title and interest in the
property to a trustee.
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IF A TRUST EXISTED IT WAS REPUDIATED BY
THE GRANTEE MORE THAN THREE YEARS PRIOR
TO COMMENCEMENT OF THIS ACTION, AND THE
CAUSE OF ACTION, IF ANY, WAS BARRED BY SUBSECTION 3, 104-2-24 U.C.A. 1943.
It is the defendant's eighth contention, Assignment of
Error No. 15, that plaintiffs' cause of action, if any, is barred
by the Statute of Limitations, sub-section 3, 104-2-24 U.C.A.
1943. It is as follows:
( 3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud
or mistake; but the cause of action in such case shall not
be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the
aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or
mistake.
The undisputed evidence in this case established that the
grantee, upon her mother's death, March 24, 1939, and thereafter until the grantee's death, 1\1arch 16, 1945, exercised exclusive possession of the property, paid the taxes, held it out
to the world as her home and in the years 1940 and 1941 made
various improvements in line with ownership of which plaintiffs
had notice. (Tr. 63, 64, 173, 174, 183, 185, 210, 212)
The cause of action in question, if any, is one sounding in
fraud - fraud in the inception - and thus it is controlled by
subsection 3, 104-2-24 U.C.A. 1943. Such is the effect of
the Utah case, Davidsen v. Salt Lake City, 81 P. 2nd 375, 118
A.L.R. 195. In this case the action was commenced to set aside
a deed on the ground of fraud in its procurement and the court
held, in an opinion by :Mr. Hoyt, District Judge, that in such
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case the 3-year Statute of Limitations applied and not the
statute relating to actions for the recovery of real property. The
court said:
But if his relief in each case depends as here upon
the cancellation of a deed for fraud or mistake, he
must bring his action within the period provided by
law for an action based upon that ground. It would
be extremely mischievous if a person claiming to be
a victim of fraud or mistake were permitted to delay
bringing his action until nearly seven years after discovery of the fraud or mistake upon which he relies.
As to the question of notice this court, in the case of Salt
Lake City v. Salt Lake Investment Co., 134 P. 603, 43 Utah 181,
said:
In Shain v. Sresovich, 104 Cal. at page 405, 38 pac.
at page 52, the Supreme Court of California, in passing upon the effect of a statute of which the portion
we have quoted above is an exact transcript, says:
·'The rule is well established that the means
of knowledge is equivalent to knowledge, and
that a party who has the opportunity of knowing
the facts constituting the fraud of which he complains cannot be supine and inactive, and afterwards allege a want of knowledge that arose by
reason of his own laches or negligence."
As to the question of notice, also see the Utah case of
Gibson v. Jensen, 158 P. 426, 48 Utah 244; Smith v. Edwards,
17 P. 2nd 264, 81 Utah 244.
And as to when the Statute of Limitations begins to run
in such an action, the Supreme Court of Arizona, in the case
of Jack Waite Mining Co. v. West, 101 P. 2nd 202, said:
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(1-3) We consider this last contention of defendant
first, for if it be correct and applicable to the facts,
there is no need for us to go further. We think it is
the law that where the trustee of an express trust, to
the knowledge of his cestui que trust, repudiates the
trust and converts the property, the statute then begins
to run. Nor do we understand that plaintiff questions
this. We also think the better reasoning is that even
though plaintiff may not have notice of the specific
repudiation of the trust, yet if he knows facts from
which a reasonable man would be put on notice that
the trust has been, or is about to be, repudiated, this
is equivalent to actual notice of the repudiation. A
cestui que trust should not be permitted to shut his
eyes and refuse to recognize a plain warning of danger,
and then claim that he had no knowledge of the catastrophe when it comes. Weniger v. Success Mining Co.,
8 cir., 227 F. 548.
And to the same effect is the Supreme Court of Montana
in the case of State ex rel. Central Auxiliary Corporation v.
Rorabeck, County Treasurer of Golden Valley County, et a!.
(Phillips Inv. Co. et al., Interveners), 108 P 2nd 601.
The court said:
( 5, 6) It is generally held that as between the trustee
and the beneficiary of a trust, the statute of limitations
does not run until the trust has been repudiated and
notice of repudiation received by the beneficiary. Blackford v. City of Libby, supra; City of New Orleans v.
Warner, 175 U.S. 120, 30 S. Ct. 44, 44 L. Ed. 96. The
rule is succinctly stated in 4 Bogert on Trusts and
Trustees, pag 951, as follows:
"The true rule with respect to the statute of limitations and express trusts is more clearly stated as follows: During performa:,nce of the express trust there
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is no cause of action for breach and so the statute
of limitations has no bearing on the rights of the cestui;
but, if the trustee violates the trust and the cestui
knows of such conduct, or could have learned of it by
the use of reasonable diligence, the court will apply
the statute of limitations which governs equitable
causes of action or an analagous statute concerning
legal causes of action. To cause the statute to begin
running during the life of the trust there must be
some act of repudiation of the trust by the trustee, as
where he declines to account to the cestui, takes trust
income for his own purposes, or sets himself up as the
owner of the trust capital."
Also see Mayse v. Mineola Co-op Exchange, 30 P. 2nd
120.

From the facts in this case it undoubtedly appears that
if the grantee fraudulently procured the conveyance of this
property upon a promise to hold it for the use and benefit
of the plaintiffs, for the purpose of distribution upon her
mother's death in order to prevent probate, that her use of
the property for 7 years thereafter in a manner as indicated
would certainly be notice to the adverse parties. If it was the
agreement distribution should have been made on her mother's
~ death, or within a reasonable time thereafter, and a party under

' such circumstances goes into possession, occupies the property,
and holds property out to the world as hers and her husband's
, and makes improvements thereon, certainly the adverse parties
have notice of a breach of trust.
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CONCLUSION

In conclusion we desire merely briefly to say that the
evidence in this case not only fails to establish a trust but that
the plaintiffs have failed to establish by clear, definite, unequi~ocal and conclusive proof that Amber Haws received
this property from her mother subject to any conditions whatsoever. In any event we believe that the security of titles and
the equities of this case demand that the decree of the district
court be set aside and that the court find the property
vested in the defendant free and clear of all encumbrances
and not subject to any demands or claims of the plaintiffs
whatsoever.
Respectfully submitted,
NEWEL

L.

G. DAINES

DELOS DAINES

CLINTON D. VERNON

Attorney.r for Defendant and
Appellant.
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